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In our previous research we reported a leftward-asymmetry in domestic chicks required
to identify a target element, on the basis of its ordinal position, in a series of identical
elements. Here we re-coded behavioral data collected in previous studies from chicks
tested in a task involving a different kind of numerical ability, to study lateralization
in dealing with an arithmetic task. Chicks were reared with a set of identical objects
representing artificial social companions. On day 4, chicks underwent a free-choice test
in which two sets, each composed of a different number of identical objects (5 vs.10 or 6
vs. 9, Experiment 1), were hidden behind two opaque screens placed in front of the chick,
one on the left and one on the right side. Objects disappeared, one by one, behind either
screen, so that, for example, one screen occluded 5 objects and the other 10 objects. The
left-right position of the larger set was counterbalanced between trials. Results show that
chicks, in the attempt to rejoin the set with the higher number of social companions,
performed better when this was located to the right. However, when the number of
elements in the two sets was identical (2 vs. 2, in Experiment 2) and they differed only
in the coloration of the objects, this bias was not observed, suggesting a predisposition
to map the numerical magnitude from left to right. Future studies should be devoted to
the direct investigation of this phenomenon, possibly employing an identical number of
mono-chromatic imprinting stimuli in both conditions involving a numerical discrimination
and conditions not involving any numerosity difference.
Keywords: number cognition, lateralization, counting, number sense, arithmetic, addition, subtraction, domestic
chick
INTRODUCTION
Since Aristotle argued that “logos” is the essence of the human
mind, logic and language were considered strictly connected
(Houndé and Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003; Vallortigara et al., 2010a,b;
Vallortigara, 2012). From this perspective, all cognitive abilities,
and especially mathematical thinking, were believed to be firmly
related to language. This is likely to be correct for symbolic math-
ematical capacity (Carey, 2004). Indeed, the ability to represent
number and selected numerical concepts, such as real numbers,
logarithms, and square roots, is only performed by a subset of
human beings, who have received specific mathematical educa-
tion. Nonetheless, human adults are also able to master some
numerical tasks when, under specific experimental conditions,
language use is prevented (Cordes et al., 2001). This non-verbal
“number sense” (all those calculations that could be solved in
the absence of numerical words) can be found, for example,
in tasks requiring individuals to add two sets of dots presented
sequentially and to choose between a correct and an incorrect
alternative. In this kind of task, both college students and rhe-
sus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are quicker and more accurate at
selecting the greater of two numbers when the numerical distance
between them is larger than when it is smaller (this is referred
to as the Distance Effect). They also perform better in distin-
guishing between two small numbers compared to two larger
numbers when the numerical distance is equal (this is referred to
as the Magnitude Effect). Such a similarity in performance sug-
gests that humans share a numerical processing mechanism with
other animal species (Cantlon and Brannon, 2007).
Although this is the most direct evidence of an ancestral
numerical mechanism shared by humans and non-humans, other
supporting data have been obtained from non-human crea-
tures (reviews in Vallortigara et al., 2010a,b). Rhesus monkeys
(Macaca mulatta; Brannon and Terrace, 1998; Merritt et al.,
2009), hamadryas baboons (Papio hamadryas), squirrel mon-
keys (Saimiri sciureus; Smith et al., 2003) and brown capuchin
monkeys (Cebus apella; Judge et al., 2005) were able to master
numerical tasks involving numbers up to 9, showing that dis-
crimination of a numerical comparison depends on the ratio of
the to be discriminated numbers (see also Call, 2000; Call, for
evidence of numerical competence in orangutangs, Pongo pyg-
maeus). Some studies have shown that numerical cognition is not
just a prerogative of primates, but that it can be found also in a
non-mammalian species, for example in the Class Aves. Simple
quantity discrimination (preference for the bigger between two
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sets of food items) has been demonstrated in robins (Petroica
longipes) (Garland et al., 2012). An African gray parrot (Psittacus
erithacus) even learned to use labels to order numbers up to 8
(Pepperberg, 2012).
Evidence of number discrimination ability has been obtained
also in very young birds (Rugani et al., 2008). Newborn chicks
(Gallus gallus) were reared with two stimuli, each characterized
by a different number of elements. Food was found in proximity
of one of the two stimuli. Subjects were then tested with stim-
uli depicting novel elements representing either the numerosity
associated or not associated with food. Chicks approached the
number associated with food in the 2 vs. 3, 2 vs. 8, 6 vs. 9, 8
vs. 14, 4 vs. 6, and 4 vs. 8, 5 vs. 10, and 10 vs. 20 compar-
isons, and did so even when quantitative cues were unavailable
or controlled (Rugani et al., 2013a). Spontaneous number dis-
crimination was demonstrated also by taking advantage of chicks’
sensitivity toward the fine visual characteristics of their own
imprinting object. Chicks reared with groups of artificial stimuli
of different numerousness prefer to approach, during a subse-
quent test, the set containing the higher number of imprinting
objects in the comparisons 1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, and 2 vs. 3 (Rugani et al.,
2010a). Moreover, when chicks are presented with sets of 2 vs. 3,
1 vs. 4, and 2 vs. 4 imprinting objects disappearing one-by-one,
each set behind one of two screens, they spontaneously inspected
the screen occluding the larger set, even when the continuous
variables (total surface area or contour length) were controlled
for (Rugani et al., 2009, 2013b,c). Nevertheless, when chicks were
presented with comparisons between large numbers of objects
(5 vs. 10 or 6 vs. 9), they succeeded only if non-numerical and
numerical cues were both available (Rugani et al., 2011a).
From these and other evidence (see Vallortigara et al., 2010a,b
for a review) it seems that numerical competence did not emerge
de novo in linguistic humans, but has been likely built on precur-
sor systems also available in non-human animals (Dehaene, 1997;
Carey, 2009).
In the field of numerical cognition, another prerogative that,
up to now, was considered to be uniquely human is the ten-
dency to orient numbers from left (small numerical values)
to right (large numerical values; Galton, 1880; Dehaene, 1993;
Fias and Fischer, 2005; Bueti and Walsh, 2009). An example of
this is provided by the SNARC (Spatial Numerical Association
of Response Codes) effect, in which humans respond faster
to smaller numbers with the left hand and to larger numbers
with the right hand (Dehaene et al., 1993). Also, when adult
humans attempted to generate numbers at random they were
influenced by lateral head turns: when the participants were fac-
ing left they produced relatively small numbers, whereas when
facing right they tended to produce larger numbers (Loetscher
et al., 2008). Patients with left-sided visuospatial neglect, typ-
ically due to damage to the right parietal lobe, bisected the
numerical interval with a systematic bias toward larger num-
bers (Zorzi et al., 2002). In addition to that, evidence sup-
ports a universal left-sided attention bias in number space:
healthy subjects required to estimate the midpoint of a numeri-
cal interval show a systematic error, consistently misplacing the
midpoint slightly to the left of its actual position (Göbel et al.,
2001).
Many studies suggested that these lateralization effects emerge
as a result of exposure to formal instruction (Shaki et al., 2009),
since scholar education could reduce or even reverse the SNARC
effect in cultures that read from right to left (Zebian, 2005; Shaki
and Fischer, 2008; Shaki et al., 2009). However, the origins of
this asymmetry, and particularly the degree to which it depends
upon cultural experience, remains elusive. Recently de Hevia et al.
(2008), de Hevia and Spelke (2010) have demonstrated that a pre-
disposition to relate number to space develops early in life, before
the acquisition of language. They have showed that 8-month-
old infants transfer the discrimination of an ordered series of
numerosities to the discrimination of an ordered series of line
lengths. Infants therefore have an intrinsic preference for num-
bers and lengths that are positively related. Even more suggestive
are the data that illustrate a tendency to represent numerical mag-
nitudes as oriented from left to right in non-human animals
(Rugani et al., 2007, 2010b, 2011b). Two bird species, domestic
chickens and Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga Columbiana) were
trained to select a target element in a series of identical ones, sagit-
taly oriented with respect to the bird’s starting point. Birds were
then tested with a series, identical to the first one, but rotated by
90◦, so that the target could be identified either from the left or
from the right end of the series. Both species selected the target
with respect to the left end, suggesting that a disposition to map
the numerical magnitude from left to right may originate from
a prelinguistic precursor. Nevertheless, the leftward preference
could be related to a general bias in the allocation of attention. In
humans this phenomenon has been named “pseudoneglect” and
reflects the fact that we primarily attend to the objects in the left
side of space (Bowers and Heilman, 1980; Jewell and McCourt,
2000). Again, this is not a prerogative of human beings, in fact
a selective allocation of attention to the left hemifield can be
found also in birds during free foraging (Diekamp et al., 2005;
Chiandetti, 2011) and in a comparative version of the line bisec-
tion task (Regolin, 2006). Somewhat similar phenomena favor-
ing the left hemifield have been described also for amphibians
(Vallortigara et al., 1998; Vallortigara and Rogers, 2005), sug-
gesting a common mechanism shared by phylogenetically distant
species.
Differently, an advantage for processing bigger numerosity,
presented in the right hemispace, could not be explained as by
product of selective left-sided attentional bias. In one of our stud-
ies, newly-hatched domestic chicks were reared for 3 days with
a group of identical artificial imprinting objects. At test when
animals were presented with sets of 5 vs. 10 (or 6 vs. 9) objects
disappearing behind one of two identical screens, they sponta-
neously inspected the screen occluding the larger set (Rugani
et al., 2011a). Across subsequent trials the larger set was made to
disappear either behind the screen located to the left or to the
right (with respect to the bird’s starting position), offering the
possibility to test for the presence of lateralization effects. Here
we reanalyze the behavior of the subjects, to investigate if the per-
formance is affected by the left-right position of the two sets. If a
tendency to represent numerousness from left to right does exist
in this species, we would expect an advantage when searching for
the larger number of social companions if this is located to the
right side.
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EXPERIMENT 1
In previous studies we reported, in two bird species, a prefer-
ence to map numbers from left to right, suggesting a lateralized
representation of number space (Rugani et al., 2007, 2010a,
2011a,b).
Here we investigate this phenomenon by observing chicks’
choice between a larger vs. a smaller group of artificial social com-
panions (i.e., objects chicks have been familiarized to through
exposure). Chicks are motivated to reach the larger group of
objects. If smaller vs. larger numerosities are spatially mapped
from left to right then we should expect chicks to be better
at responding to the larger group when located on the right.
Notably, such a finding would not be explained by the hypothesis
of attentional facilitation for the left hemispace.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects and rearing conditions
For the present experiment we re-coded behavioral data from a
sample of 36 female domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). Being the
attractor a social stimulus we employed solely female chicks, since
female chicks are more motivated than males to retrieve a social
companion (Regolin et al., 2005). Data were originally collected
by Rugani et al. (2011a). Subjects were obtained from a local com-
mercial hatchery (Agricola Berica, Montegalda, Vicenza, Italy)
when they were only a few hours old. On arrival at the laboratory,
each chick was singly housed in standard metal home cage (28 cm
wide × 32 cm long × 40 cm high) at controlled temperature (28–
31◦C) and humidity (68%), with food and water available ad
libitum in transparent glass jars (5 cm in diameter, 5 cm high)
placed at corners of the home cage. The cages were constantly
(24 h/day) lit by fluorescent lamps (36W), located 45 cm above
the floor of the cages. Each chick was reared together with an
imprinting stimulus composed of five identical objects. These
were the same for all chicks and consisted of two-dimensional,
about 1mm thick, red plastic squares (2.5 × 2.5 cm). Each object
was suspended in the center of the cage by a fine thread, at about
4–5 cm from the floor, so that they were all located at about
chicks’ head height.
Previous studies have shown that this kind of object is very
effective in producing social attachment through filial imprinting
in chicks (Rugani et al., 2009, 2010a, 2011a, 2013b).
Chicks were reared in these conditions from the morning
(11 am.) of the 1st day to the morning (12 am.) of the 3rd day
of life, when each subject singly underwent training and, about
2 h later, testing. In the time between training and testing, chicks
were placed back to their own cage with their imprinting objects.
At test, different numerical comparisons were used for dif-
ferent groups of chicks. Eighteen chicks underwent the 5 vs.
10 comparison. These chicks were divided in two experimen-
tal groups, depending on the stimuli employed during testing.
For the “no-control group” (N = 10), the original dimensions of
the imprinting squares (2.5 × 2.5 cm) were maintained, so that
both sets were composed of identical squares. In the “controlled-
stimuli group” (N = 8), the set of 10 elements again comprised
squares which dimensions were identical to those used during
imprinting. On the contrary, the set of five elements comprised
larger sized squares, balanced for either the overall area or for
the overall perimeter. In fact, for half of the chicks of the
“controlled-stimuli group” the dimensions of each square in the
set of five elements were computed in order to match the over-
all perimeter of the set of 10 elements (with squares measuring
5.00 × 5.00 cm each). For the other 4 chicks, the set of five ele-
ments had the same overall area of the set of 10 elements (with
squares measuring 3.54 × 3.54 cm each).
Other 18 chicks were tested with the comparison 6 vs. 9. As for
the first numerical comparison, 10 chicks were tested with stimuli
in which continuous variables co-varied along with numerous-
ness. For this “no-control group,” 15 identical squares measuring
2.5 × 2.5 cm were used. Again, the remaining eight chicks were
tested with stimuli in which continuous variables were equated
between the two sets. For half of the chicks of the “controlled-
stimuli group” the dimensions of the squares in the set of six
objects were computed to equate the overall perimeter of the set of
nine objects (with squares measuring 3.75 × 3.75 cm each). The
other 4 chicks were presented with sets equated in the overall area
(with squares measuring 3.06 × 3.06 cm each).
Apparatus
Training and testing took place in an experimental room located
near the rearing room. In the experimental room temperature
and humidity were controlled (respectively, at 25◦C and 70%).
The room was kept dark, except for the light coming from a 40W
lamp, placed about 80 cm above the floor of the apparatus. The
experimental apparatus (Figure 1) consisted of a circular arena
(95 cm in diameter and 30 cm outer wall height) with the floor
uniformly covered by a white plastic sheet.Within the arena, adja-
cent to the outer wall, was a holding box (10 × 20 × 20 cm), in
which each subject was confined shortly before the beginning of
FIGURE 1 | The apparatus employed in both experiments. The holding
box and the two screens are here represented in the arena just as they
were during the testing session.
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each trial. The box was made of opaque plastic sheets, with an
open top allowing the insertion of the chick before each trial.
The side of the holding box facing the center of the arena con-
sisted of a removable transparent glass partition (20 × 10 cm),
this allows the subjects, while confined, to see the inner of the
arena. During the training phase a single opaque cardboard screen
(16 × 8 cm; with 3 cm sides bent back to prevent the chicks from
seeing objects hidden behind the screen) was used, positioned
in the center of the arena, in front of and 35 cm away from the
front of the holding box. During testing, two opaque cardboard
screens (16 × 8 cm), identical in color and pattern (i.e., blue col-
ored with an orange “X” on them), were positioned in the center
of the arena, symmetrically with respect to the front of the con-
fining box (i.e., 35 cm away from it, and 20 cm spaced apart from
one another).
Procedure
Training. On day three of life, at around 12.30, chicks under-
went a preliminary training session. Each chick, together with
a single object, identical in color and dimension to the squares
composing its imprinting stimulus, was placed within the testing
arena, sitting in front of the starting box and facing the screen.
The object was held from above by the experimenter (not visible
to the chick), via a fine thread, and kept suspended 3–4 cm over
the floor, at an intermediate position between the holding box
and the screen (about 15 cm away from the screen). This initial
phase lasted for 5min, over this period the chick was free to move
around and get acquainted with the environment. Thereafter, the
experimenter slowly moved the object toward the screen, and
then behind it, until it disappeared from the chick’s sight. This
procedure was repeated a few times, until the chick started to
follow the object behind the screen as soon as it was made to
disappear. Thereafter, the chick was confined within the holding
box, from where it could see the object being moved behind the
screen. As soon as the object had completely disappeared from
sight, the chick was set free in the apparatus by lifting the trans-
parent frontal partition. Every time the chick rejoined the object,
as a reward, it was allowed to spend a few seconds with it. The
whole procedure was restarted and the training ended when the
chick had rejoined the object three consecutive times. On aver-
age, about 15min were required to complete the training for each
chick.
Testing. Testing took part 2 h after the end of training and it was
composed of 20 trials. At the beginning of each trial, the chick
was confined to the holding box with the transparent partition in
place, from where it could see the two screens in the arena. The
chick was presented with only one element at a time and could
not see either set as a whole. Every element of the first set was
placed about 10 cm from the front of the holding box and then it
was made to disappear behind one of the screens. Immediately
after it disappeared the next element was introduced into the
arena. In this way, all the elements of the first set were made to
disappear one by one behind the same screen. Then, the identi-
cal procedure was repeated for the second set behind the other
screen. Each element was kept in front of the starting box for
3 s and then it took 3 s to be moved back behind the screen (6 s
overall). About 2 s elapsed from the disappearance of one object
and the appearance of the next one. 3 s after the disappearance
of both sets, the transparent partition was removed and the chick
was left free to move within the arena. In this way the whole pro-
cedure of stimuli presentation lasted about 121 s for each trial.
The order the two sets were presented (which one was presented
first) as well as the position where they disappeared (left or right
screen) was counterbalanced within each chick’s testing trials. At
the end of stimuli presentation the chick was released in the arena
by removing the frontal transparent partition and was allowed
to look behind either of the two screens. A choice for one of the
screens was defined as when the chick’s head had entered the area
behind the screen. Only the choice for the first screen visited was
scored and thereafter the trial was considered over. At the end of
each trial, as reward, the chicks were allowed to spend a few sec-
onds with their “social companions” behind the screen chosen.
The behavior of the chicks was entirely video-recorded and it was
scored blind both online and later offline.
If the chick did not approach either screen within 3min, the
trial was considered null and void and it was repeated imme-
diately afterwards. Whenever the chick failed to respond also at
the second attempt of performing the trial, that trial was consid-
ered as null and recorded as such, this means that chicks could
score less than 20 valid trials. In the first experiment two chicks
scored 19 valid trials and two other chicks scored 18 valid trials,
the remaining 14 subjects scored all 20 valid trials.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Previous literature showed that in this sort of task chicks have a
clear tendency to approach the screen hiding the larger group of
social companions (Rugani et al., 2009, 2011a,b, 2013a; Fontanari
et al., 2011). Thus, we will henceforth define as “correct” the
choice for the screen hiding the higher number of imprinting
objects. We will similarly define the more numerous group of
social companions as “target group.”
This tendency to approach the larger group is also true for
what concerns the performance of the group of chicks re-coded
here (Rugani et al., 2011a). When the performance “no-control
group” was compared with the chance level, it resulted that sub-
jects preferentially chose the screen hiding 10 objects over the
screen hiding 5 objects [n = 10; Mean = 69.423, s.e.m. = 2.693;
one-sample t-test: t(9) = 7.213; p < 0.001], or in the compari-
son 6 vs. 9, the screen hiding 9 objects over the screen hiding 6
objects [N = 10; Mean = 66.777, s.e.m. = 2.693; t(9) = 7.619;
p < 0.001]. Nevertheless the capability to solve proto-arithmetic
calculations seems to be possible solely when numerical and
quantitative cues were contemporary available.When the perime-
ter or the area were controlled for (“control group”) we did not
find any significant preference [5 vs. 10: N = 8; Mean = 53.263,
s.e.m. = 2.320; t(7) = 1.407; p = 0.202; 6 vs. 9: n = 8; Mean =
50.361, s.e.m. = 3.747; t(7) = 0.096; p = 0.962].
A laterality index was calculated to represent the percentage
of right-sided correct choices on the overall number of correct
choices, according to the formula:
(Number of correct choices when the target group was on the
right screen/Total number of correct choices) × 100.
The laterality index can assume values ranging from 0 (all cor-
rect choices performed when the target group is behind the left
screen) to 100 (all correct choices performedwith the target group
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behind the right screen); a value of 50 indicates an equal number
of correct choices on both sides (chance level).
The laterality index was analyzed by a 2 × 2 ANOVA with
(between-subjects factors) Numerical Comparison (“5 vs. 10”
and “6 vs. 9”) and Control for Continuous Variables (“con-
trol” and “no control”). As since no significant effect for the
factor Numerical Comparison [F(1, 32) = 1.910; p = 0.177] nor
an interaction between this factor and the Control for Continuous
Variables [F(1, 32) = 0.017; p = 0.897] was detected, data were
collapsed in all further analyses and comparisons between groups
were performed by an independent sample t-test for unequal vari-
ances (Ruxton, 2006). Laterality effects were assessed comparing
the laterality index to chance level via one-sample t-tests.
Overall, chicks were significantly lateralized and performed
a higher percentage of correct choices when the target was
on the right position [t(35) = 3.777, p = 0.001, mean = 63%,
s.e.m. = 3%]. Such bias appeared to be more pronounced for
chicks of the “control” rather than of the “no control” group
(see Figure 2). However, only a marginally non-significant differ-
ence was detected between these two groups [t19.99 = 1.949, p =
0.065; mean of the “no control” group= 70%, s.e.m.= 6%;mean
of the “control” group = 57%, s.e.m. = 3%, Cohen’s d = 0.642].
Marginally non-significant results should of course be treated
with caution given their difficult interpretation. Nevertheless, in
the light of the pronounced difference between the mean score
observed in the two groups, we run a separate analysis compar-
ing the “no control” group with chance level. This allowed us to
verify that a significant lateralization effect could be detected even
in the group for which continuous variables were not controlled
[t19 = 2.53, p = 0.02].
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1 we provide a first evidence in a non-human
species of an advantage when the larger set is found to the right
side of the subject. This bias could be due to an effect specific
of numerical processing, or rather to a non-numerical preference
when searching for social attractors on the right side. To con-
trol for this alternative explanation, in the present experiment,
we analyzed the behavior of chicks tested according to the same
FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1. Percentages of laterality index
(means ± s.e.m.) scored by control and no-control group of chicks. The
dotted line (y = 50) represents chance level. ∗ indicates p < 0.05.
paradigm, but with equal numbers of objects disappearing behind
each screen. If the bias highlighted in Experiment 1 has a non-
numerical basis, we would expect it to appear also here, when
choice is not based on numerical cues as identical numbers of
items are presented to the left and to the right side.
Both sets used in Experiment 2 were composed of two objects
(i.e., the comparison was of 2 vs. 2). The numerosity of each set,
hence the overall number of objects present, was smaller than in
Experiment 1. Rearing conditions, however, were very similar in
that chicks in both experiments were exposed tomultiple (i.e., five
or six) objects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects and rearing conditions
For the present experiment we analyzed the behavior of a sample
of 12 female domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). Behavioral data were
originally collected by Fontanari et al. (2011). The experiment
that we have re-coded here was originally designed to investi-
gate if chicks were able to use property information (e.g., color)
for object individuation, exploiting chicks’ spontaneous tendency
to approach the larger group of familiar objects. For this rea-
son imprinting stimuli differed from Experiment 1, being com-
posed of three green squares and three yellow squares (4 × 4 cm).
Beside that, rearing conditions were identical to those previously
described. This should not cause any difficulty for the compari-
son of the results of the present experiment and of Experiment 1,
where objects of identical color were used. Indeed, for the chicks
of Experiment 2 objects of both colors were familiar, in a com-
parable way with respect to Experiment 1, because both have
been used during rearing and were treated as imprinting objects
(Rugani et al., 2010a).
Training stimuli and procedure
Testing stimuli were green and yellow squares (4 × 4 cm). At each
training trial only a single square (either a yellow one or a green
one) was used. During training the two stimuli were used the
same number of times. All the other training conditions were
exactly the same described for the Experiment 1.
Testing stimuli and procedure
Test stimuli were identical to those employed during training. At
each testing trial two pairs were sequentially presented (a low-
variety and a high-variety pair). For the low-variety pair two
identical squares (yellow + yellow or green + green) were used.
For the high-variety pair two squares of a different color (yellow+
green) were employed. The presentation of each pair proceeded as
follows: the two objects weremade to simultaneously appear from
one screen, coming in front of the chick confined in the holding
box and then made to slowly disappear behind the same screen.
The whole procedure took approximately 20 s. After a delay of
5 s, the chick was set free within the arena. Ten test trials were
administered to each chick.
The use in the two pairs of the color (yellow or green) of
the objects was randomized between subjects, whereas the order
of presentation of the two pairs as well as which screen con-
cealed which pair were counterbalanced within subjects across
subsequent trials.
No subjects performed null trial in this Experiment.
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this experiment chicks were not presented with a numerical
discrimination, but rather with the choice between approaching
either a screen hiding two identical social companions (low-
variety pair), or a screen hiding two social companions differing
in color from one-another (high-variety pair). We arbitrarily
defined the high-variety pair as the target group. In order to
compute a laterality index we thus applied the formula:
(Number of choices when the target group was on the right
screen/Total number of choices for the target object) × 100.
A one-sample t-test was used to compare the laterality index
with chance-level (i.e., with the value of 50%, indicating absence
of lateralization). Contrary to what observed in Experiment 1, in
the present experiment we were unable to detect any significant
departure from chance level [t(11) = 0.379, p = 0.712, mean =
52%, s.e.m. = 6%].
It should be noted that the absence of a significant effect in
this case could be related to the minor number of subjects tested
in Experiment 2. To assess this objection we have run two dif-
ferent analyses. First of all we computed the minimum number
of subjects that would be required to reach a statistically signif-
icant effect, given the effect size observed in Experiment 1. A
power analysis (G∗Power 3.1 software) revealed that, assuming
the standard power value of 0.8, at least 14 subjects would be
required in a one-tailed t-test. That is, two subjects more than
those employed in Experiment 2. The sample size of Experiment
2 is not far way from the desired N, nevertheless on the basis of
this result we have to recognize that is not possible to rule out
lack of statistical power as an explanation. Also, the results of
the power analysis are crucially dependent on the arbitrary value
assigned to the “power” parameter, and more conservative val-
ues would increase the dimension of the required sample size.
However, these computations are of course based on the assump-
tion that the same effects size computed for Experiment 1 applies
also to Experiment 2. Another interesting approach is to compute
the minimum sample size needed to reach significant departure
from chance level, based on the values of Mean and SD actu-
ally observed in Experiment 2. This revealed that the number of
subjects that would be required to reach a statistically significant
effect in this Experiment would be of 620, greatly exceeding the
sample size of Experiment 1. This speaks against the possibility
to obtain drastically different results by increasing sample size of
two units.
To conclude even if this second Experiment is not charac-
terized by a strong power, nonetheless it seems to suggest that
a number-space association could be there in this kind of task.
On the grounds that non-significant results must be interpreted
with caution, it is not possible to unequivocally conclude that our
results reflect a precursor of the left-to-right mental number line
orientation, but this investigation will be one of the most relevant
scientific challenges in this field of research.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 allowed us to detect a rightward bias, evident when
domestic chicks are required to search for the larger number of
objects in the comparisons 5 vs. 10 and 6 vs. 9. In contrast,
Experiment 2 revealed that, when no numerical discrimination
is involved in the task, chicks tested in the same apparatus and
with a similar procedure to that described for Experiment 1,
do not reveal any directional bias. This difference could be due
to a number of reasons. First of all, set numerosities involved
in Experiment 1, 2 were rather different, with large numerosi-
ties being employed in the first and small numerosities being
employed in the second experiment. However we have no reasons
to believe that small or large numbers of social companions trig-
ger for qualitatively different processing.Moreover similar rearing
conditions were used in the two experiments, exposing chicks
in both cases to multiple objects. This procedure would activate
the same cognitive system for the processing of both small and
large numbers (Rugani et al., 2013a,b,c). A second issue concerns
whether a preferential choice is or is not expressed by subjects
for one of the two sets. Fontanari et al. (2011) (where from data
of Experiment 2 come) reported lack of preference between two
identical vs. two different objects. Absence of any significant lat-
eralization in Experiment 2 may therefore depend on the lack of
preference for one of the two sets. This hypothesis though would
not be consistent with evidence provided in Experiment 1 of the
present paper. In fact, chicks in the study of Rugani et al. (2011a)
(where from data of Experiment 1 come) did not discriminate
sets of 6 vs. 9 and 5 vs. 10 objects when continuous variables
were controlled for. Nevertheless, in Experiment 1 a clear lat-
eralization emerged for chicks tested in such condition. Indeed,
chicks of the “control” condition tended to display an even more
pronounced rightward bias than chicks in the “no control” con-
dition. Both in Experiment 2 and in the “control” condition of
Experiment 1 chicks did not show a significant preference for
one of the two sets. Nevertheless, only when the two sets dif-
fered in numerosity, such as in Experiment 1, chicks emitted a
higher number of correct choices if the larger set was on their
right side.
It seems that a bias can be observed only when chicks have
to choose between sets differing in numerosity. This evidence
would support previous findings that animals map numerical val-
ues onto space, though it would demand an explanation beyond
the hypothesis of attentional facilitation for the left hemis-
pace. Further research is warranted for understanding this phe-
nomenon, the effect should be replicated with other numerosities
and with new control conditions, but most interestingly, new
experiments should probe, within a same paradigm, both an
advantage to respond to large numbers located to the right side
as well as to small numbers located to the left side.
Here we have shown that chicks, in the attempt to rejoin the
set with the higher number of social companions, performed
better when this was located to their right side. This bias is
reminiscent of the well-known phenomenon of the left-to-right
orientation of number line in our species. Originally this orien-
tation was thought to be dependent on cultural factors, such as
the reading direction, making it implausible to observe a simi-
lar phenomenon in non-human animals (Dehaene et al., 1993).
This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the asso-
ciation of smaller numbers with left space and larger numbers
with right space is stronger in bilingual subjects after reading a
Russian text (that is read from left to right) than after reading an
Hebrew text (that is read from right to left; Shaki and Fischer,
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2008). More recent investigations, however, suggest that read-
ing habits themselves are unlikely to be the only origin of this
spatial-numerical arrangement (Fischer and Brugger, 2011). For
example, it is possible to reverse the spatial association for num-
bers merely by instructing observers to think of numbers as either
indicating lengths on a ruler or time on a clock face (which have
opposite horizontal mappings for small and large digits; Bächtold
et al., 1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2004). Moreover, developmental
studies suggests that preschool children already explore objects
more efficiently when they are numbered in ascending order from
left to right (Opfer and Furlong, 2011). Using a manual bisection
paradigm, with lines flanked by arrays of dots, 5-year-old children
showed the same bias of 7-year-old children and adults, indicat-
ing that the left-to-right mapping of numbers into space could
emerge spontaneously and independently of formal instruction
(de Hevia and Spelke, 2009).
Evidence suggestive of a left-to-right numerical orientation
has been recently obtained also in non-human species. Domestic
chicks and Clark’s nutcrackers, trained to select a target element
in a sagitally-oriented series and tested with a rotated series, iden-
tified as correct solely the element from the left end of the series
(Rugani et al., 2007, 2010b, 2011b). This phenomenon, how-
ever, could be linked to a general bias for allocating attention
in the left emispace, rather than to a specific lateralization of
numerical representation (Rugani et al., 2011b). Here, employ-
ing a completely different paradigm, we reported a rightward
bias that emerges when domestic chicks are required to search
for the larger number of objects, in the comparisons 5 vs. 10
and 6 vs. 9 (Experiment 1). Such a bias was not found when
the numerousness of the two sets were equated, in the compar-
ison 2 vs. 2 (Experiment 2). Obviously, such an advantage for
the right-hemispace cannot be explained as a byproduct of a
leftward attentional prioritization. Although further evidence is
necessary, we believe that the results presented in this paper pro-
vide the first evidence suggesting an orientation effect of purely
numerical origin.
Interestingly enough, it is well known that in this species the
level of lateralization is determined by the exposure of embryos
to light during a critical period (from day 17 to 21 of incu-
bation). Chicks hatched from light incubated eggs are strongly
lateralized, whereas the lateralization is largely prevented in
dark-incubated chicks (Daisley et al., 2009; Chiandetti, 2011).
All chicks used in these Experiments came from a commer-
cial hatchery, where eggs were maintained in darkness. However,
sometimes the light was turned on in order to guarantee the
routine maintenances, reducing the control over the degree of
lateralization caused to the embryos. We thus consider these
subjects as poorly lateralized, but, due to the not perfectly con-
trolled incubation conditions, we are currently unable to draw
strong conclusions about the role of light-exposure in this lat-
eralization effect. This issue could be better investigated in
future experiments with chicks obtained from light vs. dark
laboratory-incubated eggs.
Overall these data suggest that a disposition to map the
numerical magnitude from left to right may originate from
a prelinguistic precursor. The phenomena associated with
basic numerical competence seem to be rooted in biological
primitives that can be explored also in very young animals.
Some sort of a Kantian “a priori” intuition that precedes and
structures how animals (human and non-human) experience
the environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was supported by a research grant from University
of Padova to Rosa Rugani (“Progetto Giovani,” Bando 2010,
Università degli Studi di Padova, prot.: GRIC101142).
REFERENCES
Bächtold, D., Baumüller, M., and Brugger, P. (1998). Stimulus–response com-
patibility in representational space. Neuropsychologia 36, 731–735. doi:
10.1016/S0028-3932(98)00002-5
Bowers, D., and Heilman, K. M. (1980). Pseudoneglect: effects of hemispace on
a tactile line bisection task. Neuropsychologia 18, 491–498. doi: 10.1016/0028-
3932(80)90151-7
Brannon, E. M., and Terrace, H. S. (1998). Ordering of the numerosities 1-9 by
monkeys. Science 282, 746–749. doi: 10.1126/science.282.5389.746
Bueti, D., and Walsh, V. (2009). The parietal cortex and the representation of time,
space, number and other magnitudes. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
364, 1831–1840. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0028
Call, J. (2000). Estimating and operating on discrete quantities in oranges
(Pongo pygmaeus). J. Comp. Psychol. 114, 136–147. doi: 10.1037/0735-7036.
114.2.136
Cantlon, J. F., and Brannon, E. M. (2007). How much does number matter to a
monkey? J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 33, 32–41. doi: 10.1037/0097-
7403.33.1.32
Carey, S. (2004). Bootstrapping and the origins of concepts. Daedalus 133, 59–68.
doi: 10.1162/001152604772746701
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chiandetti, C. (2011). Pseudoneglect and embryonic light stimulation in the avian
brain. Behav. Neurosci. 125, 775–782. doi: 10.1037/a0024721
Cordes, S., Gelman, R., Gallistel, C. R., andWhalen, J. (2001). Variability signatures
distinguish verbal from nonverbal counting for both large and small numbers.
Psychol. Bull. Rev. 8, 698–707. doi: 10.3758/BF03196206
Daisley, J. N., Mascalzoni, E., Rosa Salva, O., Rugani, R., and Regolin, L. (2009).
Lateralization of social cognition in the domestic chicken (Gallus gallus).
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 965–981. doi: 10.1098/rstb.
2008.0229
Dehaene, S. (1993). Numerical Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell edition.
Dehaene, S. (1997). The Number Sense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., and Giraux, P. (1993). The mental representation of parity
and number magnitude. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 122, 371–396. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.122.3.371
de Hevia, M. D., Girelli, L., Bricolo, E., and Vallar, G. (2008). The representa-
tional space of numerical magnitude: illusions of length. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 61,
1496–1514. doi: 10.1080/17470210701560674
de Hevia, M. D., and Spelke, E. S. (2009). Spontaneous mapping of num-
ber and space in adults and young children. Cognition 110, 198–207. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.003
de Hevia, M. D., and Spelke, E. S. (2010). Number-space mapping in human
infants. Psychol. Sci. 21, 653–660. doi: 10.1177/0956797610366091
Diekamp, B., Regolin, L., Gunturkun, O., and Vallortigara, G. (2005). A
left-sided visuospatial bias in birds. Curr. Biol. 15, R372–R373. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2005.05.017
Fias, W., and Fischer, M. H. (2005). “Spatial representation of number,” in
Handbook of Mathematical Cognition, ed J. Campbell (Philadelphia, PA:
Psychology Press), 43–54.
Fischer, M. H., and Brugger, P. (2011). When digits help digits: spatial-numerical
associations point to finger counting as prime example of embodied cognition.
Front. Psychol. 2:260. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00260
Fontanari, L., Rugani, R., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2011). Object individu-
ation in 3-day old chicks: use of property and spatiotemporal information. Dev.
Sci. 14, 1235–1244. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01074.x
Galton, F. (1880). Visualised numerals. Nature 21, 252–256. doi: 10.1038/021252a0
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 150 | 7
Rugani et al. Lateralized mechanisms for encoding of object
Garland, A., Low, J., and Burns, K. C. (2012). Large quantity discrimination
by North Island robins (Petroica longipes). Anim. Cogn. 15, 1129–1140. doi:
10.1007/s10071-012-0537-3
Göbel, S., Walsh, V., and Rushworth, M. F. S. (2001). The mental num-
ber line and the human angular gyrus. Neuroimage 14, 1278–1289. doi:
10.1006/nimg.2001.0927
Houndé, O., and Tzourio-Mazoyer, N. (2003). Neural foundations of logical and
mathematical cognition. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 507–514. doi: 10.1038/nrn1117
Jewell, G., and McCourt, M. E. (2000). Pseudoneglect: a review and meta-analysis
of performance factors in line bisection tasks. Neurospychologia 38, 93–110. doi:
10.1016/S0028-3932(99)00045-7
Judge, P. G., Evans, T. A., and Vyas, D. K. (2005). Ordinal representation of numeri-
cal quantities by brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.
Behav. 31, 79–94. doi: 10.1037/0097-7403.31.1.79
Loetscher, T., Schwarz, U., Schubiger, M., and Brugger, P. (2008). Head
turns bias the brain’s internal generator. Curr. Biol. 18, 60–62. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2007.11.015
Merritt, D., Rugani, R., and Brannon, E. (2009). Empty sets as part of the numer-
ical continuum: conceptual precursors to the zero concept in rhesus monkeys.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 138, 258–269. doi: 10.1037/a0015231
Opfer, J. E., and Furlong, E. E. (2011). How numbers bias preschoolers’ spatial
search. J. Cross-Cult. Psychol. 42, 682–695. doi: 10.1177/0022022111406098
Pepperberg, M. I. (2012). Further evidence for addition and numerical compe-
tence by a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus). Anim. Cogn. 15, 711–717. doi:
10.1007/s10071-012-0470-5
Regolin, L. (2006). The case of the line-bisection: when both humans and chickens
wander left. Cortex 42, 101–103. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70330-7
Regolin, L., Rugani, R., Pagni, P., and Vallortigara, G. (2005). Delayed
search for a social and a non-social goal object by the young domes-
tic chick (Gallus gallus). Anim. Behav. 70, 855–864. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.
2005.01.014
Rugani, R., Fontanari, L., Simoni, E., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2009).
Arithmetic in newborn chicks. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 276,
2451–2460. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2009.0044
Rugani, R., Kelly, M. D., Szelest, I., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2010a).
It is only humans that count from left to right? Biol. Lett. 6, 290–292. doi:
10.1098/rsbl.2009.0960
Rugani, R., Cavazzana, A., Vallortigara, G., and Regolin, L. (2013c). One, two, three,
four, or is there somethingmore? Numerical discrimination in day-old domestic
chicks. Anim. Cogn. 16, 557–564. doi: 10.1007/s10071-012-0593-8
Rugani, R., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2007). Rudimental competence in 5-
day-old domestic chicks: identification of ordinal position. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim.
Behav. Process. 33, 21–31. doi: 10.1037/0097-7403.33.1.21
Rugani, R., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2008). Discrimination of small
numerosities in young chicks. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 34, 388–399.
doi: 10.1037/0097-7403.34.3.388
Rugani, R., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2010b). Imprinted numbers: newborn
chicks’ sensitivity to number vs. continuous extent of objects they have been
reared with. Dev. Sci. 13, 790–797. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.0
Rugani, R., Regolin, L., and Vallortigara, G. (2011a). Summation of large
numerousness in newborn chicks. Front. Psychol. 2:179. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2011.00179
Rugani, R., Vallortigara, G., and Regolin, L. (2013a). From small to large.
Numerical discrimination by young domestic chicks. J. Comp. Psychol. doi:
10.1037/a0034513. [Epub ahead of print].
Rugani, R., Vallortigara, G., and Regolin, L. (2013b). Numerical abstraction in
young domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). PLoS ONE 8:e65262. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0065262
Rugani, R., Vallortigara, G., Vallini, B., and Regolin, L. (2011b). Asymmetrical
number-space mapping in the avian brain.Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 95, 231–238.
doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2010.11.012
Ruxton, G. D. (2006). The unequal variance t-test is an underused alternative to
Student’s t-test and the Mann–Whitney U test. Behav. Ecol. 17, 668–690. doi:
10.1093/beheco/ark016
Shaki, S., and Fischer, M. (2008). Reading space into numbers-a cross-
linguistic comparison of the SNARC effect. Cognition 108, 590–599. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.04.001
Shaki, S., Fischer, M. H., and Petrusic, W. M. (2009). Reading habits for both words
and numbers contribute to the SNARC effect. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16, 328–331.
doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.2.328
Smith, B. R., Piel, A. K., and Candland, D. K. (2003). Numerity of a Socially-
housed Hamadyras baboon (Papio hamadryas) and a socially housed squirrel
monkey (Saimiri Sciureus). J. Comp. Psychol. 17, 217–225. doi: 10.1037/0735-
7036.117.2.217
Vallortigara, G. (2012). Core knowledge of object, number, and geometry: a
comparative and neural approach. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 29, 213–236. doi:
10.1080/02643294.2012.654772
Vallortigara, G., Chiandetti, C., Sovrano, V. A., Rugani, R., and Regolin, L. (2010a).
Animal cognition. wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cogn. Sci. 1, 882–893. doi:
10.1002/wcs.75
Vallortigara, G., Regolin, L., Chiandetti, C., and Rugani, R. (2010b). Rudiments
of mind: number and space cognition in animals. Comp. Cogn. Behav. Rev. 5,
78–99. doi: 10.3819/ccbr.2010.50004
Vallortigara, G., and Rogers, L. J. (2005). Survival with an asymmetrical brain:
advantages and disadvantages of cerebral lateralization. Behav. Brain Sci. 28,
575–589. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05360109
Vallortigara, G., Rogers, L. J., Bisazza, A., Lippolis, G., and Robins, A. (1998).
Complementary right and left hemifield use for predatory and agonis-
tic behaviour in toads. Neuroreport 9, 3341–3344. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
199810050-00035
Vuilleumier, P., Ortigue, S., and Brugger, P. (2004). The number space and neglect.
Cortex 40, 399–410. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70134-5
Zebian, S. (2005). Linkages between number concepts, spatial thinking, and direc-
tionality of writing: the SNARC effect and the reverse SNARC effect in English
and Arabic monoliterates, biliterates, and illiterate Arabic speakers. J. Cogn.
Cult. 5, 165–190. doi: 10.1163/1568537054068660
Zorzi, M., Priftis, U., and Umiltà, C. (2002). Brain damage: neglect disrupts the
mental number line. Nature 417, 138–139. doi: 10.1038/417138a
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 04 November 2013; accepted: 06 February 2014; published online: 24
February 2014.
Citation: Rugani R, Rosa Salva O and Regolin L (2014) Lateralized mechanisms for
encoding of object. Behavioral evidence from an animal model: the domestic chick
(Gallus gallus). Front. Psychol. 5:150. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00150
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Rugani, Rosa Salva and Regolin. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 150 | 8
